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Dogmas
and the Changing Images of Foundations
José Ferreirós
Universidad de Sevilla
Abstract: I oﬀer a critical review of several diﬀerent conceptions of the activ-
ity of foundational research, from the time of Gauss to the present. These are
(1) the traditional image, guiding Gauss, Dedekind, Frege and others, that sees
in the search for more adequate basic systems a logical excavation of a priori
structures, (2) the program to ﬁnd sound formal systems for so-called classical
mathematics that can be proved consistent, usually associated with the name
of Hilbert, and (3) the historicist alternative, guiding Riemann, Poincaré, Weyl
and others, that seeks to perfect available conceptual systems with the aim
to avoid conceptual limitations and expand the range of theoretical options.
I shall contend that, at times, assumptions about the foundational enterprise
emerge from certain dogmas that are frequently inherited from previous, out-
dated images. To round the discussion, I mention some traits of an alternative
program that investigates the epistemology of mathematical knowledge.
Resumen: Ofrecemos una revisión crítica de varias concepciones de la in-
vestigación sobre los fundamentos de la matemática, desde los tiempos de
Gauss hasta el presente. Se trata de (1) la imagen tradicional, que guió a
Gauss, Dedekind, Frege y otros, y que ve en la búsqueda de sistemas básicos
más adecuados una excavación lógica de estructuras a priori, (2) el programa
de encontrar sistemas formales correctos para la llamada matemática clásica
que puedan demostrarse consistentes, habitualmente asociado al nombre de
Hilbert, y (3) la alternativa historicista, que guió a Riemann, Poincaré, Weyl
y otros, la cual busca perfeccionar los sistemas conceptuales disponibles a ﬁn
de evitar limitaciones conceptuales y ampliar el abanico de opciones teóricas.
Philosophia Scientiæ, cahier spécial 5, 2005, 27–42.
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Defenderé que, en ocasiones, se encuentran supuestos acerca del trabajo so-
bre fundamentos que emergen de ciertos dogmas, frecuentemente heredados
de imágenes previas ya superadas. Para completar la discusión, menciono al-
gunos rasgos de un programa alternativo, que investiga la epistemología del
conocimiento matemático.
Confronted with my title, the reader may have thought that it is an
unhappy idea to put together the notion of foundations and the word
“dogma.” After all, foundational research consists of logical and/or math-
ematical results formulated and proved in the most rigorous possible way.
Thus we are talking of a domain of objective results, unaﬀected by beliefs
or vogues. To put it simply: we are talking about logic, not about any
aspect of culture that may be aﬀected by dogmas or by historical shifts.
Only the fact that we have been living in this intellectual atmosphere of
postmodernism — you may have reﬂected — can explain why such titles
are taken even a bit seriously.
What can I reply? The diﬃcult thing for me would be to convince
you that those points include some subtleties that are far from being
“evident,” and, at the same time, that granting this does not throw us
in the arms of postmodern thinking. That, as I say, would be a diﬃcult
argument, and I will not try to make it here. So let me begin in a
diﬀerent way. Let me underscore that the word “images” is in my title
for some reason.
My aim is to reﬂect on the activity of foundations research. Once
we conceive of it as an activity, a practice, it is automatic that founda-
tions research does not come down to a bunch of theorems — not even
a multilayered set of problems, methods and theories. Following Leo
Corry [1997],1 let us call those theories, methods and results the body
of foundational knowledge. As all practitioners know, the practice of
foundations research is also guided by certain images of this enterprise,
images which may vary from researcher to researcher, and certainly from
time to time. These images tell us about the goals one pursues when
doing foundational research, about important and irrelevant problems,
acceptable and unacceptable, promising and unpromising ways of ap-
proaching these problems, and so on.
What my title suggests is not that the body of foundational results is
1Corry talks about the modern structural approach in the images of mathematics
and in the body of mathematics (e.g., with Bourbaki, or with category theory).
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aﬀected by dogmas, just that some images of foundations are. Put this
way, I am sure more than one reader will be relieved.
In fact, examples of dogmatic attitudes abound. A noteworthy one
can be found in Quine’s writings on set theory. I do not mean his distrust
of the Zermelo–Fraenkel system for axiomatic set theory (ZFC) and his
desire to consider alternative systems. What seems dogmatic to me is
his philosophical evaluation of the paradoxes, the so-called “bankruptcy
theory.” Here, Quine was fully in agreement with Russell: the paradoxes
had shown commonsense logic to be contradictory. This view is put
forward not only in his Mathematical Logic [Quine 1940, § 29], but also in
the much later Set Theory and its Logic [Quine 1963, Introduction]. Here
he writes that the “only natural attitude” towards the notion of class,
which is so fundamental to thought, is the Comprehension Principle:
that every open sentence in one variable determines a class. The eﬀect
of the paradoxes was to discredit this natural attitude, to show that
“commonsense is bankrupt,” and “intuition” is not to be trusted.
Quine was dismayed to ﬁnd that most logicians were “retraining their
intuition” by immersing themselves in the system of ZFC set theory. In
his view, one ought to consider the whole variety of possible systems
(type theory, ZFC, von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory, Quine’s
own systems known as NF and ML,2 and so on), treating none of them
as standard. For it would be imprudent to consider one single system as
the standard, natural one [Quine 1963, pp. viii, 1, 5].
In my opinion, Quine’s views on what he calls “commonsense” and
“bankruptcy” are worthless as a philosophy. There is no rationale for
thinking that the Comprehension Principle is more “natural” as a hy-
pothesis than any other, say Zermelo’s Axiom of Separation. As a piece
of history, however, Quine’s views are very interesting and revealing —
they display before us the picture of a generation of logicians whose “in-
tuitions,” to use his word, had been trained in the logic of classes based
on Comprehension.3 One is tempted to apply here Kuhn’s terminology,
speaking of a paradigm shift (from the Comprehension logic of classes
to axiomatic systems of set theory), of Quine as a member of the old
generation, unable to absorb the impact of the revolution, and so on.
But this is not our topic today.
2The abbreviations come from the titles of the works in which he proposed those
systems: ‘New Foundations’ (1937) and Mathematical Logic [Quine 1940].
3The notion of intuition that emerges here is very far from the Kantian one, but
perhaps close to the teachings of Felix Klein.
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1. Generalities about dogma.
In what follows I intend to discuss several diﬀerent images of foundations,
and a few dogmas that are in fact interrelated. Let me open my mind
and mention at least one of these right away. We all have some image of
what the relations are between foundations, logic, and human reason (a
noteworthy triangle). This frequently belongs to our cherised intimate
convictions, and it may well happen that we do not want to discuss
them with strangers. I beg your pardon, but as a philosopher it is my
business to thematize such intimate convictions and reﬂect about them,
eventually trying to see if they depend too much on traditional beliefs.
Just in case somebody doubts that the connections between logic,
reason and foundations can really be found in noteworthy contributions
to this ﬁeld, let me oﬀer an example. Recall the well-known Hilbert
program. It is interesting to reﬂect on some of the more philosophical
opinions that Hilbert expressed (and actually he was generous in oﬀering
such opinions). For instance, in his address ‘Axiomatisches Denken’ of
1918 we can read:
[. . . ] the most important mathematical thinkers [. . . ] have always culti-
vated the relations to the neighboring sciences, especially the great empires
of physics and epistemology, above all for the beneﬁt of mathematics itself.
The essence of these relations and the reasons for their fruitfulness will be
most clear [. . . by] describing [. . . ] the axiomatic method. [Hilbert 1935,
146]
In recent years, historians such as Volker Peckhaus [1991] and Leo Corry
[1997] have made clear the extent to which this was not propaganda, but
the expression of a serious concern of Hilbert’s with physics (especially
its axiomatization) and with epistemology.
In the celebrated 1900 lecture on ‘Mathematische Probleme’, Hilbert
already expresses his concern with deductive ﬁnitism, and says as follows:
This requirement of logical deduction by means of a ﬁnite number of pro-
cesses is simply the requirement of rigour in reasoning. Indeed the re-
quirement of rigour, which has become proverbial in mathematics, corre-
sponds to a universal philosophical necessity of our understanding (Ver-
stand). [Ewald 1996, vol. 2, 1099]
As Michael Hallett [1994] has made clear in a paper devoted to connec-
tions between Hilbert’s axiomatic method and the “laws of thought,” his
ﬁnitism was thus meant to express a key (though weak) principle about
the workings of the mind. In 1928, Hilbert made the point by saying
nothing less than the following:
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The fundamental idea of my proof theory is none other than to describe
the activity of our understanding, to make a protocol of the rules according
to which our thinking actually proceeds. [van Heijenoort 1967, 475]
In these sentences, the word Verstand seems to have been chosen to
comply with Kant’s terminology,4 but, being a bit less literal, we could
perfectly well translate it by “reason.”
In sum, according to Hilbert there is a very close link between foun-
dational research and the study of thinking and reason, i.e., epistemol-
ogy. To be sure, Hilbert did not pretend that his Beweisstheorie would
exhaust that study and supplant epistemology. Many important episte-
mological matters would remain open even after the satisfactory comple-
tion of his program (see Peckhaus [1991]). But the foundational results
of Beweisstheorie certainly had, in his view, quite direct epistemological
implications.
Is this a conception that one must share? Or, does it depend on cer-
tain assumptions that are open to questioning? A short general reﬂection
may suggest the latter. In both scientiﬁc and mathematical research, ten
years are a very long time, but, as you know, in the realm of human be-
liefs and intellectual traditions a century may not be a very long time.
It is only in the last century and a half that we have started to think
about human beings and minds in terms of evolution.5 We belong to a
culture that has almost always regarded men and women as having an
eternal essence, and most of us have been raised in this belief. Diﬀerent
names for that essence, obviously with diﬀerent connotations, have been
“the soul” and “reason.”
Kant’s philosophical ideas, to be sure, were formulated long before
any need could be felt to even faint that such a belief should be ques-
tioned. So one might well employ the following rule of thumb: whenever
you see a foundational researcher that is deeply inﬂuenced by Kant, be-
ware and consider the possibility that he may be equating epistemology
with foundations in a way that is unwarranted, i.e., that is based on
questionable assumptions.
Intimately entangled with the idea of a special link between logical
foundations and human reason, one can ﬁnd other noteworthy beliefs.
When we do research on the foundations of mathematics, we look for
systematic foundations. Of course it is very healthy and interesting to
4His distinction of the more dry faculty of the Verstand (understanding) from
the idealizing faculty of the Vernunft (reason).
5I mean here the fact of biological evolution on earth, and leave open the thorny
question of the right theory of evolution.
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search for uniﬁcation and system, and I could have nothing against it.
But, when coupled with the above-mentioned belief in a transcendent
essence, one can easily be led into thinking that the systematic foun-
dations one obtains tell us something about human reason. The very
idea of systematicity may thus, coupled with other beliefs, give rise to a
second dogma.
We might go on trying to locate and reconsider beliefs that could
be dogmatic. Some come to my mind rather quickly. The idea that
mathematics and logic are marked out by enjoying absolute certainty,
by consisting of results built on the most solid rock (not “on sand,” as
Weyl once wrote). Or perhaps our habit of taking logic to be a (even the)
kernel of human knowledge, and our associated tendency to assume that
any act of thinking ought to correspond to some kind of logic (say, e.g.,
inductive logic). Also the high expectations we place on the capacity of
formal systems to capture all kinds of subtle concepts and relations.
But enough. At this point we shall stop talking generalities and be-
gin to examine some particular, historically given images of foundations.
This will allow me to review some key stages in the evolution of founda-
tional ideas, and also to analyze the emergence and persistence of some
dogmatic beliefs. We shall concentrate on the ﬁrst two mentioned above:
the idea of a special link between foundations and epistemology, and the
epistemological interpretation of systematicity.
2. Two traditional images: Gauss to Hilbert.
Let me begin with Gauss, just 200 years ago. As a young man, Gauss
was interested in philosophy and read Kant and other philosophers with
some care. We are fortunate to have a few statements of his, expressing
thoughts about the philosophical foundations of mathematics — what
he called, using now obsolete terminology, the “metaphysics of mathe-
matics.”6 Occasionally, Gauss felt the need to enter into a discussion of
such philosophical topics in order to clear the way to novel mathemat-
ical developments. Thus he ended up touching on the “metaphysics” of
number, of magnitudes, and of space. Particularly important were his
parallel reﬂections on the epistemological foundations of geometry and
of arithmetic. These reﬂections were rich in mathematical content, since
they related to Gauss’s evolving views on non-Euclidean geometry and
diﬀerential geometry, on number theory and function theory. Their ﬁnal
6Fragments from 1800, 1816–17, 1825, 1831. See [Ferreirós, forthcoming ].
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outcome was synthesized by the learned man in the form of a Greek
motto:
  
“God does arithmetic,” his thoughts consist in numbers and number-
relations, even when we cannot follow them. The signiﬁcance of this
statement can only be understood if we take into account that Plato
is reported to have said, “God does geometry.” The Gaussian motto
documents the end of the millenary domination of geometry in West-
ern images of mathematical knowledge, and starts a historical period in
which pure mathematics would be “under the sign of number” [Hilbert
1897]. The idea was spelled out in letters of 1817 and 1830; I quote the
1830 letter to Bessel:
According to my most intimate conviction, the theory of space has a com-
pletely diﬀerent position with regards to our knowledge a priori, than the
pure theory of magnitudes. Our knowledge of the former lacks completely
that absolute conviction of its necessity (and therefore of its absolute truth)
which is characteristic of the latter. We must humbly acknowledge that, if
number is just a product of our minds, space also has a reality outside our
minds, and that we cannot prescribe its laws a priori. [Gauss 1900, 201]
The language is strikingly Kantian, certainly more so than the language
we ﬁnd in Poincaré’s allusions to Kantian epistemology.
Gauss was not doing “metaphysics” in our current sense of the word.
What he did was to search for new systematic accounts of several math-
ematical topics, to elaborate new mathematical theories, hoping to ﬁnd
thereby the philosophical and epistemological basis of mathematical
knowledge. But his results and theories did not possess philosophical
meaning in and oﬀ themselves. They acquired epistemological signiﬁ-
cance because Gauss viewed them against the background of Kantian
(and Leibnizian) epistemology. He was guided by the old image of hu-
man knowledge as a combination of elements derived from two sources:
Reason and the senses, the rational and the empirical. In Gauss’s view,
agreeing with Leibniz and Kant, mathematical knowledge has a strictly
rational core, which is an a priori product of pure Reason. Geometry
did not belong in that core, which he now identiﬁed with “arithmetic”
in a broad sense — the theory of the complex number system in all its
aspects.
Though some of these reﬂections became available to the public as of
1831, for the most part they remained in the hands of a few friends until
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they ﬁnally were published in the 1860s. From this time on, it became
customary among relevant German authors to conceive of “arithmetic”
as another name for pure mathematics, and to exclude geometry from
this domain.7 To give just an example, when Dedekind gave expression
to the view that pure mathematics is logic, 4 years after Frege but inde-
pendently of him, he wrote: “arithmetic (algebra, analysis) is just a part
of logic.” Interestingly, Dedekind chose to synthesize his new view with
a motto that prolonged the Plato–Gauss tradition:
   
i.e., “man ever arithmetizes.” With this new move, the pure theory of
numbers and their relations ceases to be a godly matter, to become
human, very human.
In the preface to his epoch-making Was sind und was sollen die
Zahlen?, Dedekind made clear his opinion that arithmetic and pure
mathematics are a matter of logic, an immediate product of the reine
Denkgesetze, the pure laws of thought. They rest solely on the notions of
set and mapping, and therefore on primitive abilities of the mind without
which no thinking at all is possible. Thus they are available to anyone
in possession of a gesunder Menschenverstand, a sane common under-
standing. Dedekind went as far as to propose the view that the chain
of proofs that he presented in detail takes place actually in the mind of
his readers as soon as they employ numbers; only it takes place uncon-
sciously, and so our consciousness extends merely to some byproducts,
complex arithmetical truths that we usually mistake for simple, intuitive
evidences.
To me, the situation with Dedekind is reminiscent of what we have
seen apropos of Quine. I admire very much Dedekind’s work, but his
belief that the notions of set and mapping are primitive ones, that they
are engraved in our minds from the time of conception — this I can only
regard as an unwarranted belief, and in all likelihood a false one. It is
surprising to ﬁnd that so many authors, including good philosophers of
mathematics in recent years, still consider the notion of set as an intuitive
one, as epistemologically primitive.8 Of course this point is easier for
us to grasp with hindsight, thanks to our knowledge of issues like the
7There is an early exception, Martin Ohm, who identiﬁed Zahlenlehre with pure
mathematics from as early as 1819. He is certainly relevant because his textbooks
and his views enjoyed wide diﬀusion in the Gymnasien.
8Choosing only among ﬁrst-rate authors, an example can be found in Maddy
[1992].
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polemics surrounding the axiom of choice, the possibility of predicative
and other deviant conceptions of sets, and so on.
The work of Weierstrass, Dedekind and others on the “arithmetiza-
tion” of pure mathematics led to modern systems of logic and set theory,
which started to become explicit in work of Dedekind, Peano, and Frege
during the 1880s. But these men were still immerse in the old concep-
tion of human knowledge, and through them it inﬂuenced other authors
like Hilbert himself. As we have seen with Dedekind [1888, iv–v], they
believed that actual human knowledge, as historically given, is (partly
at least) the product of unconscious rational, logical thinking activities.9
Their search for deeper systems of mathematics was for them a logical
excavation in the hidden structure of Reason. This constellation of ideas
we shall call Image 1.
Image 1 was also in Frege’s mind when he compared arithmetic “with
a tree that unfolds upwards in a multitude of techniques whilst the root
drives into the depths” [Frege 1893, xiii]. Frege’s main goal was epistemo-
logical: he wanted to prove most strictly that the laws of arithmetic are
a priori, indeed that they are purely logical laws. It was only as a means
to obtain full control of his assumptions and developments, to check sys-
tematically that his goal had been attained, that he became interested in
formal systems of logic. As I have said before, under the assumptions of
Image 1, it was natural to expect that the systematic search for sounder
and broader logical bases would amount to a search for epistemological
foundations. But images of foundations and foundational research have
changed greatly since the nineteenth century.
* * *
The search for logical foundations culminated in the new axiom sys-
tems proposed during the decade 1899–1908 for geometry, for the arith-
metic of both the natural and the real numbers, for set theory. The gain
in terms of uniﬁcation, systematization, and freedom to work in modern
mathematics, was undeniable and certainly wonderful.
These new systems were perfected and made fully precise some twenty
years later with their strict formalization (due in good measure to Weyl,
Skolem, Hilbert and Bernays)10. Around 1920, Hilbert conceived of a
9Frege is a diﬀerent matter, for his ﬁght against psychologistic logic distanced
him from this standpoint, but he had little success until well into the 20th century.
10Of course, here one must also remember Frege, Peano, Russell and Whitehead,
but when I say “strict” formalization I must refrain from citing them (especially the
last three). We are talking about ﬁrst-order formal axiomatizations.
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change in perspective that would give rise to a new foundational program
and a new image. The new Image 2 inherited many of the traits of 1,
unreﬂectedly to a good extent. Hilbert was still attracted by Image 1,
but he was aware of the diﬃculties involved in trying to show the a priori
(indeed, the logical) nature of any of the above-mentioned systems, and
particularly aware of the need to reﬁne and develop logic to suit the
needs of modern mathematics.
Hilbert and Bernays started the new conception when it ﬁnally be-
came clear that the former’s hopes for a revival of logicism, in the wake
of Principia Mathematica,11 had foundered. This had a neat eﬀect on
the goals of the whole foundational program, for now it was no longer
a matter of establishing the truth of the propositions belonging to pure
mathematics, or the sources for such truths, but merely a question of es-
tablishing the acceptability of classical mathematical systems by a strict
proof of consistency. The shift was not voiced very much aloud, but it is
very noteworthy — it involved acceptance of the hypothetical character
of pure mathematics (what some call, ambiguously, its ‘quasi-empirical’
status), and thus a deep reform of received images of mathematical
knowledge.12
Within Image 2, the main goal was to ﬁnd sound formal systems,
suﬃciently powerful to derive all of classical mathematics within them
(a requirement that was at ﬁrst simply equated with completeness), but
such that they could be ﬁnitarily proven to be consistent. Recourse to
formal languages, which in Frege had been merely a means to check the
suﬃciency of the proposed axioms/principles,13 now became an essential
trait of the foundational program.
But many authors continued to believe that the formal systems would
somehow uncover the hidden logical structure of mathematical Reason,
which supposedly had always acted behind the course of historical events.
Some even hoped that the chosen system would be all-embracing, in
such a way that new mathematical developments would remain within
its bounds. As if our historical experience did not show mathematics to
be a creative human activity, and mathematical theories the temporary
outcomes of an open-ended process of development.
11I am referring to the 1917 Zürich address Axiomatisches Denken (in [Hilbert
1935]) and to some of Hilbert’s courses at Göttingen. On this topic, see Sieg [1999].
12From Plato to Kant, from Descartes (perhaps even Euclid?) to Frege, the propo-
sitions of mathematics were taken to be truths simpliciter.
13“thus we obtain a basis for judging the epistemological nature of the law we have
proven” (preface to Frege [1893]).
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When Gödel’s incompleteness results forced foundational research to
shift its main target, from consistency to goals such as relative consis-
tency (and others), a very interesting branch of mathematics came to
maturity — indeed, a handful of branches. We might go on here and
attempt a ﬁner analysis of several new and diﬀerent Images 2.1, . . . 2.n
of foundational research, among which programs like those of proof the-
ory, model theory, or reverse mathematics, are particularly noteworthy.
These programs have made available very interesting results, such as
those of Gentzen and his followers on the consistency of arithmetic and
other systems, the results of Cohen on the independence of the Con-
tinuum Hypothesis, etcetera, and more recently the results obtained in
predicative mathematics and reverse mathematics.
From the standpoint of my present review of the connections between
foundations and epistemology, however, we must emphasize that one can
no longer see in any of these projects and results a full-ﬂedged program to
establish the foundations of mathematical knowledge. Their epistemo-
logical relevance is not obvious, which contrasts strongly with Hilbert’s
desire to “eliminate from the world once and for all the question of the
foundations of mathematics” by establishing the absolute “freedom from
contradiction” of the classical theories with his Beweisstheorie. (To be
sure, the idea I am now presenting is not new, it has been emphasized,
e.g., by Feferman and Sieg; but too many others are not yet aware of it.)
I would not wish to go on without one further comment. To say that
foundational studies, in their present shape, are not immediately relevant
to the epistemology of mathematics, is by no means the same as saying
that they are (or even worse: that they must be) irrelevant. Many of the
classical results in foundational studies are highly illuminating as to the
nature and characteristic traits of classical mathematics. A paradigmatic
example was the increasingly clearer realization of the contrast between
(process-oriented) constructive mathematics, and classical mathematics
(object-oriented, “platonistic”). Another was, of course, the discover-
ies about possibilities and limits of the formalization of mathematical
theories.
While many present-day results on foundational matters will proba-
bly be of no consequence to future epistemological debates, some are of
a diﬀerent kind. From this standpoint, I would like to warn against a
wrong interpretation of my words, and I would like to make a call for
renewed interactions between foundational studies and the philosophy of
mathematics (to which I must add the history of mathematics).
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3. A historical alternative: Riemann to
Kitcher.
Let us come back to the presumed convergence of systematic founda-
tions with epistemological roots. I have suggested (very sketchily) some
ideas about its origins and development, and how it became increasingly
dissolved within the transformations suﬀered by foundational research in
the twentieth century. Today, the old static image of knowledge is deeply
outdated, judging it against the framework of present-day philosophy or,
for that matter, of contemporary scientiﬁc knowledge. Once we discard
the a priori belief in the existence of a transcendent human faculty that
goes under the name of Reason; once we take into account scientiﬁc dis-
coveries about the biological and cultural evolution of humanity; once we
consider historical studies of past mathematical theories and practices;
it becomes quite doubtful that a hidden structure may have been present
throughout.
For reasons like these, in recent decades new kinds of historicistic and
naturalistic conceptions of mathematical knowledge have emerged. It is
interesting to realize that these recent trends are akin to a very diﬀer-
ent approach to the foundations that existed since the mid-nineteenth
century, coexisting with Images 1 and 2. We may speak of a tradition
starting already with Riemann, and continuing through a good num-
ber of twentieth-century authors. Interestingly, Poincaré counts among
them.
Due to his philosophical beliefs, Riemann consciously avoided the
image of Reason as the a priori source of knowledge. In his view, all
knowledge arises from the interplay of “experience” broadly conceived
(Erfahrung) and “reﬂection” (Nachdenken) in the sense of reconceiving
and rethinking. Human knowledge begins in everyday experiences and
proceeds to propose conceptual systems which aim to clarify experience
by going beyond the surface of appearances. Reason in the old sense is
found nowhere, there is no hidden a priori structure — those elements
in our theories which do not simply arise from sense-data are just of
a conjectural nature, hypotheses like the axioms of geometry [Riemann
1854].14 To give you at least a superﬁcial impression of Riemann’s turn
of mind, let me quote a fragment from the last page of his famous lecture
On the hypotheses upon which geometry is founded :
A decision regarding these questions [about the validity of geometrical as-
14It may be convenient to remind the reader that Riemann’s diﬀerential-geometric
axioms or “hypotheses” are quite diﬀerent from, and deeper than, Euclid’s.
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sumptions at diﬀerent levels of physical reality] can only be taken by start-
ing from the previous conception of phenomena, whose foundations were
laid by Newton and which has been conﬁrmed by experience, and by re-
forming it gradually, considering facts that cannot be explained from it.
Investigations which start from general concepts, like the one developed
here, can only serve to avoid that such work may be hindered by concep-
tual limitations, and that the progress in our knowledge of the connections
among things may be limited by prejudices handed down by tradition.
[Riemann 1854, 286]
For Image 3, the point of foundational studies is to perfect available
conceptual systems by spotting conceptual or theoretical inadequacies, to
expand the range of available concepts and avoid conceptual limitations,
to strive for greater generality, and to eliminate traditional prejudices.
Thus, Image 3 is strongly diachronistic. It is no longer a matter of
excavating hidden structures, but of going beyond traditional ideas in
order to gain a deeper grasp of reality (though perhaps not a perfectly
realistic one).
New forms of developmental understanding of mathematical knowl-
edge would later be found in Weyl, in Piaget, in French authors like
Cavaillès, even in one of Hilbert’s closer collaborators, Paul Bernays
[1976]. More recently, philosophers such as Lakatos and Kitcher joined
this group and tried to analyze the ﬁne structure of historical processes
of mathematical development.
But, should we come to the conclusion that mathematical knowl-
edge is absolutely undetermined, except for the constraints imposed by
tradition and history? In my opinion, not at all.
4. Towards a new image of the roots of math-
ematics.
Human history, including mathematical history, is an expression of hu-
man activities. Its diversity and degrees of freedom will therefore be
limited by any strong constraints acting upon human activity. Here, I
must limit myself to a rough sketch of what seem to be key constraints
(though I am obviously aware of the controversial nature of these issues,
and the resulting need to discuss carefully and substantiate each of the
following points).
Human beings are members of the human species, “linguistic animals”
as Aristotle said, at once biological and social. A world of physical
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objects, biological abilities and needs, sense-perception and motor action,
the use of language within a web of social life and common activities —
these are some of the constraints bounding human activity and therefore
history.
That constitutes an invitation to explore and formulate varieties of
so-called naturalism that may ﬁt with biology and history at a time.
To avoid confusions generated by the trendy and equivocal term “natu-
ralism,” it might be preferable to describe the kind of viewpoints I am
thinking about through some other label. Perhaps one might use the
phrase genetic epistemology, but in a sense divergent from orthodox Pi-
agetianism. Indeed the adjective “genetic” suggests the biological genesis
of human knowledge, its emergence from our natural abilities, but also
the historical genesis of human knowledge.
At this point, we are not talking about an “image 4” of foundations,
because this kind of viewpoint incorporates a deep shift, which we could
try to make explicit by distinguishing roots from foundations. Now we
are not analyzing the foundations of mathematics, looking for a purely
rational or (at least) a perfectly systematic framework within which to
develop current mathematics. Instead, we aim to explore the epistemo-
logical roots of mathematical knowledge. This is what I mean to con-
note by changing the biological metaphor of roots for the architectural
metaphor of foundations.
But, again, this is not the place to attempt an original theoretical
development. So let me close with some remarks on a most noteworthy
proponent of naturalism, none other than Quine [1969]. The writings
of this great philosopher and logician radiate with the joy of engaging
in the search for systems. Quine was a great system builder both as a
logician, as a philosopher of language, and as a naturalist. But when he
transferred this trend of mind from logic to epistemology, I believe he
was making a characteristic mistake. In line with the old epistemologi-
cal tradition, Quine believed that the search for systematic foundations
converges with the quest for epistemological roots. In this latter context,
however, systematicity may well be a trap rather than a virtue.
Let me give a telegraphic example. There is not the least reason to be-
lieve that arithmetic as practiced by a 10-year-old child “must converge”
with the foundations of our set of natural numbers, or that fractions as
used by diﬀerent cultures must be systematically explained together with
the rational number system [Benoit et al., 1992]. Elementary, common-
sense arithmetic can be understood from a purely constructive stand-
point, while the step to N as a set, harmless as it may seem to present-
day mathematicians, involves of course the introduction of actual inﬁnity.
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Peano arithmetic involves quantiﬁcation over inﬁnite domains, and thus
what Hilbert and his followers called a “transﬁnite axiom” [Hilbert 1925,
382].
What a genetic epistemology (in the above sense) should do, is to an-
alyze the epistemological roots of these diﬀerent practices and theories,
and to understand the links between them (be they cognitive, historical,
social, or what not). It should also emphasize the shifts and displace-
ments which distance them, and search for the factors that help explain
those shifts. In doing so, one must carefully avoid the temptation of
being over-systematic. So let me take exception to Quine’s dogma, and
invite you again, in the spirit of Riemann, to reconsider received ideas
on all of these issues.
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